fix(server): bloqueia SSRF e path traversal na sessão e segue redirects

- SSRF: /api/queue aceitava qualquer URL, inclusive localhost, rede
  privada e 169.254.169.254. Agora só http/https e, por padrão, nada de
  endereço local/privado (checagem na fila e no conector do undici, que
  cobre DNS rebinding e redirects). ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK=true libera.
- O header x-session-id virava nome de diretório sem validação; com ".."
  a expiração faria rmSync em server/. Agora só UUID é aceito.
- Respostas 3xx eram salvas como se fossem o arquivo; agora segue até 5
  redirects e trata 3xx restante como erro.
- decodeURIComponent inválido no Content-Disposition derrubava o download.
- web: useCallback em refreshTasks (corrige o warning exhaustive-deps).

server/src/index.ts

@@ -2,18 +2,18 @@ import Fastify, { FastifyRequest, FastifyReply } from "fastify";
 import cors from "@fastify/cors";
 import fastifyStatic from "@fastify/static";
 import { z } from "zod";
-import { Agent, setGlobalDispatcher } from "undici";
+import { Agent, interceptors, setGlobalDispatcher } from "undici";
 import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
 import { dirname, resolve } from "node:path";
 import { sessionManager } from "./lib/SessionManager.js";
 import { DownloadManager } from "./lib/DownloadManager.js";
+import { UrlNotAllowedError, createGuardedConnector } from "./lib/netGuard.js";
 
 // Otimização: Agente HTTP global com conexões persistentes e timeout relaxado.
 // Isso ajuda a manter a performance em downloads paralelos e evita gargalos de socket.
 const agent = new Agent({
-  connect: {
-    timeout: 30_000,
-  },
+  // O conector recusa destinos locais/privados (SSRF), inclusive em redirects.
+  connect: createGuardedConnector({ timeout: 30_000 }),
   pipelining: 1,
   keepAliveTimeout: 10_000,
   connections: 500, // Aumenta limite de conexões simultâneas
@@ -51,7 +51,11 @@ app.get("/health", async () => {
   return { status: "ok" };
 });
 
-const downloadManager = new DownloadManager(agent);
+// Segue até 5 redirects (links de download costumam redirecionar); sem isso o
+// corpo da resposta 3xx era salvo como se fosse o arquivo.
+const downloadManager = new DownloadManager(
+  agent.compose(interceptors.redirect({ maxRedirections: 5 })),
+);
 
 // Helper to get session from header
 const getSession = (req: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) => {
@@ -85,8 +89,12 @@ app.post("/api/queue", async (request, reply) => {
   const parse = queueSchema.safeParse(request.body);
   if (!parse.success) return reply.status(400).send({ error: "Invalid URL" });
 
-  const task = await downloadManager.queueDownload(session.id, parse.data.url);
-  return task;
+  try {
+    return await downloadManager.queueDownload(session.id, parse.data.url);
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (err instanceof UrlNotAllowedError) return reply.status(400).send({ error: err.message });
+    throw err;
+  }
 });
 
 // 3. List Tasks (Polling)

server/src/lib/DownloadManager.ts

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import { Transform } from "node:stream";
 import { request, Dispatcher } from "undici";
 import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
 import { sessionManager } from "./SessionManager.js";
+import { assertDownloadableUrl } from "./netGuard.js";
 
 type DownloadStatus = "queued" | "downloading" | "completed" | "error";
 
@@ -28,6 +29,16 @@ export type DownloadTask = {
 // mapa não cresce sem limite num servidor de longa duração.
 const tasks = new Map<string, DownloadTask>();
 
+// decodeURIComponent lança em sequências inválidas (ex.: "%E0%A4%A"); nesse caso
+// mantém o texto original em vez de falhar o download inteiro.
+function safeDecode(value: string): string {
+    try {
+        return decodeURIComponent(value);
+    } catch {
+        return value;
+    }
+}
+
 export class DownloadManager {
 
     constructor(private globalAgent: Dispatcher) {
@@ -49,15 +60,13 @@ export class DownloadManager {
     }
 
     public async queueDownload(sessionId: string, url: string): Promise<DownloadTask> {
+        const parsedUrl = assertDownloadableUrl(url);
         const id = randomUUID();
 
         // Try to determine filename
         let filename = "download.bin";
-        try {
-            const u = new URL(url);
-            const p = u.pathname.split("/").pop();
-            if (p) filename = basename(p);
-        } catch { }
+        const lastSegment = parsedUrl.pathname.split("/").pop();
+        if (lastSegment) filename = basename(lastSegment);
 
         const task: DownloadTask = {
             id,
@@ -96,7 +105,7 @@ export class DownloadManager {
                 headers: { "User-Agent": "Ephemeral-Downloader/2.0" }
             });
 
-            if (response.statusCode >= 400) {
+            if (response.statusCode >= 300) {
                 throw new Error(`HTTP Error ${response.statusCode}`);
             }
 
@@ -107,7 +116,7 @@ export class DownloadManager {
                 if (match?.[1]) {
                     // O header vem do host de origem: usar apenas o nome base evita
                     // caminho relativo (../) escrevendo fora do diretório da sessão.
-                    const headerName = basename(decodeURIComponent(match[1].replace(/"/g, "")));
+                    const headerName = basename(safeDecode(match[1].replace(/"/g, "")));
                     if (headerName) {
                         task.filename = headerName;
                     }

server/src/lib/SessionManager.ts

@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ const STORAGE_ROOT = process.env.STORAGE_ROOT
     : resolve(SERVER_ROOT, "storage");
 const SESSION_TIMEOUT_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 Hour
 
+// O id vem do header x-session-id e vira nome de diretório: aceitar só UUID
+// impede path traversal (por exemplo "..", que apagaria server/ na expiração).
+const SESSION_ID_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i;
+
 type SessionData = {
     id: string;
     lastActive: number;
@@ -41,6 +45,8 @@ export class SessionManager {
     public getSession(id?: string): SessionData {
         const now = Date.now();
 
+        if (id !== undefined && !SESSION_ID_PATTERN.test(id)) id = undefined;
+
         if (id && this.sessions.has(id)) {
             const session = this.sessions.get(id)!;
             session.lastActive = now;

server/src/lib/netGuard.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+import { lookup as dnsLookup } from "node:dns";
+import { isIP } from "node:net";
+import { buildConnector } from "undici";
+
+/**
+ * Proteção contra SSRF: o servidor baixa qualquer URL que o cliente enviar,
+ * então por padrão ele recusa endereços de loopback, rede privada, link-local
+ * (inclui o endpoint de metadados de nuvem 169.254.169.254) e similares.
+ *
+ * Para rodar o servidor numa rede privada e baixar de hosts internos de
+ * propósito, defina ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK=true.
+ */
+
+export class UrlNotAllowedError extends Error {
+    constructor(message: string) {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = "UrlNotAllowedError";
+    }
+}
+
+const allowPrivateNetwork = () => process.env.ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK === "true";
+
+function parseIPv4(ip: string): number[] | null {
+    const parts = ip.split(".").map(Number);
+    return parts.length === 4 && parts.every((n) => Number.isInteger(n) && n >= 0 && n <= 255)
+        ? parts
+        : null;
+}
+
+function isBlockedIPv4([a, b, c]: number[]): boolean {
+    return (
+        a === 0 || // "esta rede"
+        a === 10 || // privada
+        a === 127 || // loopback
+        (a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) || // CGNAT
+        (a === 169 && b === 254) || // link-local / metadados de nuvem
+        (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) || // privada
+        (a === 192 && b === 0 && c === 0) || // IETF protocol assignments
+        (a === 192 && b === 168) || // privada
+        (a === 198 && (b === 18 || b === 19)) || // benchmarking
+        a >= 224 // multicast, reservado e broadcast
+    );
+}
+
+/** Expande um IPv6 para 8 grupos de 16 bits (ou null se for inválido). */
+function parseIPv6(ip: string): number[] | null {
+    let text = ip.split("%")[0].toLowerCase(); // remove zone id
+    const embedded = text.match(/^(.*:)(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$/);
+    if (embedded) {
+        const v4 = parseIPv4(embedded[2]);
+        if (!v4) return null;
+        text = `${embedded[1]}${((v4[0] << 8) | v4[1]).toString(16)}:${((v4[2] << 8) | v4[3]).toString(16)}`;
+    }
+
+    const halves = text.split("::");
+    if (halves.length > 2) return null;
+    const head = halves[0] ? halves[0].split(":") : [];
+    const tail = halves.length === 2 && halves[1] ? halves[1].split(":") : [];
+    const missing = 8 - head.length - tail.length;
+    if (missing < (halves.length === 2 ? 1 : 0) || (halves.length === 1 && missing !== 0)) return null;
+
+    const groups = [...head, ...Array(missing).fill("0"), ...tail].map((g) => parseInt(g, 16));
+    return groups.length === 8 && groups.every((g) => g >= 0 && g <= 0xffff) ? groups : null;
+}
+
+function isBlockedIPv6(ip: string): boolean {
+    const g = parseIPv6(ip);
+    if (!g) return true; // não conseguiu interpretar: recusa por segurança
+
+    const allZeroUntil = (n: number) => g.slice(0, n).every((x) => x === 0);
+    const v4FromTail = () => [g[6] >> 8, g[6] & 0xff, g[7] >> 8, g[7] & 0xff];
+
+    if (allZeroUntil(7) && g[7] <= 1) return true; // :: e ::1
+    if (allZeroUntil(5) && g[5] === 0xffff) return isBlockedIPv4(v4FromTail()); // ::ffff:a.b.c.d
+    if (g[0] === 0x64 && g[1] === 0xff9b && g.slice(2, 6).every((x) => x === 0)) {
+        return isBlockedIPv4(v4FromTail()); // NAT64 64:ff9b::/96
+    }
+    return (
+        (g[0] & 0xfe00) === 0xfc00 || // fc00::/7 (unique local)
+        (g[0] & 0xffc0) === 0xfe80 || // fe80::/10 (link-local)
+        (g[0] & 0xff00) === 0xff00 // multicast
+    );
+}
+
+/** true se o endereço IP (v4 ou v6) pertence a uma faixa não pública. */
+export function isBlockedAddress(ip: string): boolean {
+    const family = isIP(ip);
+    if (family === 4) return isBlockedIPv4(parseIPv4(ip)!);
+    if (family === 6) return isBlockedIPv6(ip);
+    return true;
+}
+
+function isBlockedHostname(hostname: string): boolean {
+    const host = hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").toLowerCase();
+    if (host === "localhost" || host.endsWith(".localhost")) return true;
+    return isIP(host) !== 0 && isBlockedAddress(host);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Valida a URL antes de enfileirar: só http/https e, a menos que
+ * ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK=true, nada de localhost ou IP privado literal.
+ * Nomes de domínio que resolvem para IP privado são barrados na conexão.
+ */
+export function assertDownloadableUrl(rawUrl: string): URL {
+    let url: URL;
+    try {
+        url = new URL(rawUrl);
+    } catch {
+        throw new UrlNotAllowedError("Invalid URL");
+    }
+
+    if (url.protocol !== "http:" && url.protocol !== "https:") {
+        throw new UrlNotAllowedError("Only http and https URLs are allowed");
+    }
+    if (!allowPrivateNetwork() && isBlockedHostname(url.hostname)) {
+        throw new UrlNotAllowedError("URLs pointing to local or private addresses are not allowed");
+    }
+    return url;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Conector do undici que revalida o destino em cada conexão (inclusive nos
+ * redirects): IP literal é checado antes de conectar e nomes são checados no
+ * IP já resolvido, o que também cobre DNS rebinding.
+ */
+export function createGuardedConnector(options: buildConnector.BuildOptions): buildConnector.connector {
+    const connect = buildConnector({
+        ...options,
+        lookup: (hostname, lookupOptions, callback) => {
+            dnsLookup(hostname, lookupOptions, (err, address, family) => {
+                if (err) return callback(err, address as never, family as never);
+                const list = Array.isArray(address) ? address.map((a) => a.address) : [address];
+                const blocked = !allowPrivateNetwork() && list.some(isBlockedAddress);
+                if (blocked) {
+                    return callback(
+                        new UrlNotAllowedError(`${hostname} resolves to a local or private address`),
+                        address as never,
+                        family as never,
+                    );
+                }
+                callback(null, address as never, family as never);
+            });
+        },
+    } as buildConnector.BuildOptions);
+
+    return (opts, callback) => {
+        if (!allowPrivateNetwork() && isBlockedHostname(opts.hostname)) {
+            callback(new UrlNotAllowedError("Blocked local or private address"), null);
+            return;
+        }
+        connect(opts, callback);
+    };
+}

server/test/netGuard.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import { createServer, type Server } from "node:http";
+import type { AddressInfo } from "node:net";
+import { rmSync } from "node:fs";
+import { Agent, interceptors } from "undici";
+import {
+    UrlNotAllowedError,
+    assertDownloadableUrl,
+    createGuardedConnector,
+    isBlockedAddress,
+} from "../src/lib/netGuard.js";
+import { loadModules } from "./helpers.js";
+
+// Resolve "internal.test" para um IP privado e o resto para um público,
+// sem depender de DNS real.
+vi.mock("node:dns", () => ({
+    lookup: (
+        host: string,
+        opts: { all?: boolean },
+        cb: (err: Error | null, address: unknown, family?: number) => void,
+    ) => {
+        const address = host === "internal.test" ? "10.0.0.5" : "93.184.216.34";
+        if (opts?.all) cb(null, [{ address, family: 4 }]);
+        else cb(null, address, 4);
+    },
+}));
+
+afterEach(() => {
+    delete process.env.ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK;
+});
+
+describe("isBlockedAddress", () => {
+    it.each([
+        "0.0.0.0", "10.1.2.3", "100.64.0.1", "127.0.0.1", "169.254.169.254",
+        "172.16.0.1", "172.31.255.255", "192.168.1.1", "198.18.0.1", "224.0.0.1",
+        "255.255.255.255", "::", "::1", "fc00::1", "fd12:3456::1", "fe80::1",
+        "ff02::1", "::ffff:127.0.0.1", "::ffff:7f00:1", "::ffff:10.0.0.1",
+        "64:ff9b::7f00:1",
+    ])("bloqueia %s", (ip) => {
+        expect(isBlockedAddress(ip)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it.each([
+        "8.8.8.8", "1.1.1.1", "93.184.216.34", "172.15.0.1", "172.32.0.1",
+        "100.63.0.1", "198.20.0.1", "2606:4700:4700::1111", "::ffff:8.8.8.8",
+    ])("permite %s", (ip) => {
+        expect(isBlockedAddress(ip)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it("bloqueia o que não é IP", () => {
+        expect(isBlockedAddress("example.com")).toBe(true);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("assertDownloadableUrl", () => {
+    it("aceita http e https públicos", () => {
+        expect(assertDownloadableUrl("https://example.com/a.zip").hostname).toBe("example.com");
+        expect(assertDownloadableUrl("http://8.8.8.8/a.zip").hostname).toBe("8.8.8.8");
+    });
+
+    it.each(["ftp://example.com/a", "file:///etc/passwd", "javascript:alert(1)"])(
+        "recusa o protocolo de %s",
+        (url) => {
+            expect(() => assertDownloadableUrl(url)).toThrow(/http and https/);
+        },
+    );
+
+    it("recusa URL inválida", () => {
+        expect(() => assertDownloadableUrl("not a url")).toThrow(UrlNotAllowedError);
+    });
+
+    it.each([
+        "http://localhost:3000/", "http://app.localhost/", "http://127.0.0.1/",
+        "http://[::1]/", "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
+        "http://10.0.0.1/", "http://192.168.0.10:8080/", "http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/",
+        "http://2130706433/", // 127.0.0.1 em decimal: o parser do WHATWG normaliza
+    ])("recusa %s", (url) => {
+        expect(() => assertDownloadableUrl(url)).toThrow(/local or private/);
+    });
+
+    it("libera endereços privados com ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK=true", () => {
+        process.env.ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK = "true";
+        expect(assertDownloadableUrl("http://127.0.0.1/").hostname).toBe("127.0.0.1");
+    });
+});
+
+describe("createGuardedConnector", () => {
+    const connect = (hostname: string) =>
+        new Promise<Error | null>((done) => {
+            const connector = createGuardedConnector({ timeout: 2000 });
+            connector({ hostname, host: hostname, protocol: "http:", port: "9" }, (err, socket) => {
+                socket?.destroy();
+                done(err);
+            });
+        });
+
+    it("recusa IP literal privado antes de conectar", async () => {
+        expect(await connect("127.0.0.1")).toBeInstanceOf(UrlNotAllowedError);
+    });
+
+    it("recusa nome que resolve para IP privado", async () => {
+        const err = await connect("internal.test");
+        expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(UrlNotAllowedError);
+        expect(err?.message).toMatch(/internal\.test resolves/);
+    });
+
+    it("deixa passar nome que resolve para IP público (falha só ao conectar)", async () => {
+        const err = await connect("public.test");
+        expect(err).not.toBeInstanceOf(UrlNotAllowedError);
+    });
+});
+
+describe("DownloadManager com a proteção", () => {
+    let origin: Server | undefined;
+
+    afterEach(async () => {
+        if (origin) await new Promise((done) => origin!.close(done));
+        origin = undefined;
+    });
+
+    async function startOrigin(handler: Parameters<typeof createServer>[1]) {
+        origin = createServer(handler);
+        await new Promise<void>((done) => origin!.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", done));
+        return (origin.address() as AddressInfo).port;
+    }
+
+    async function waitWhileDownloading(read: () => string | undefined) {
+        for (let i = 0; i < 500 && read() === "downloading"; i++) {
+            await new Promise((done) => setTimeout(done, 5));
+        }
+    }
+
+    it("recusa enfileirar URL privada", async () => {
+        const { sessionManager, DownloadManager, storageRoot } = await loadModules();
+        const manager = new DownloadManager(new Agent());
+        const session = sessionManager.getSession();
+        // loadModules() reimporta os módulos, então a classe não é a mesma: compara pelo nome.
+        await expect(manager.queueDownload(session.id, "http://127.0.0.1:1/x")).rejects.toMatchObject({
+            name: "UrlNotAllowedError",
+        });
+        expect(manager.getTasks(session.id)).toEqual([]);
+        rmSync(storageRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    });
+
+    it("segue redirect e salva o arquivo final, não o corpo do 302", async () => {
+        process.env.ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK = "true";
+        const port = await startOrigin((req, res) => {
+            if (req.url === "/start") {
+                res.writeHead(302, { location: "/final.bin" });
+                res.end("redirecting");
+                return;
+            }
+            res.setHeader("content-length", "5");
+            res.end("hello");
+        });
+
+        const { sessionManager, DownloadManager, storageRoot } = await loadModules();
+        const agent = new Agent({ connect: createGuardedConnector({ timeout: 2000 }) }).compose(
+            interceptors.redirect({ maxRedirections: 5 }),
+        );
+        const manager = new DownloadManager(agent);
+        const session = sessionManager.getSession();
+        const task = await manager.queueDownload(session.id, `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/start`);
+        await waitWhileDownloading(() => manager.getTask(task.id)?.status);
+
+        const finished = manager.getTask(task.id)!;
+        expect(finished.status).toBe("completed");
+        expect(finished.totalBytes).toBe(5);
+        rmSync(storageRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    });
+
+    it("marca erro quando a resposta 3xx não é seguida", async () => {
+        process.env.ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK = "true";
+        const port = await startOrigin((_req, res) => {
+            res.writeHead(302);
+            res.end("nope");
+        });
+
+        const { sessionManager, DownloadManager, storageRoot } = await loadModules();
+        const manager = new DownloadManager(new Agent());
+        const session = sessionManager.getSession();
+        const task = await manager.queueDownload(session.id, `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/`);
+        await waitWhileDownloading(() => manager.getTask(task.id)?.status);
+
+        expect(manager.getTask(task.id)).toMatchObject({ status: "error", error: "HTTP Error 302" });
+        rmSync(storageRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    });
+});

server/test/sessions.test.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
 import { createServer, type Server } from "node:http";
 import type { AddressInfo } from "node:net";
 import { existsSync, readdirSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
+import { sep } from "node:path";
 import { Agent } from "undici";
 import { loadModules } from "./helpers.js";
 
@@ -11,6 +12,7 @@ let origin: Server;
 let originUrl: string;
 
 beforeEach(async () => {
+    process.env.ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK = "true"; // a origem de teste está em 127.0.0.1
     vi.useFakeTimers({ toFake: ["setInterval", "Date"] });
     origin = createServer((_req, res) => {
         res.setHeader("content-length", "5");
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@ beforeEach(async () => {
 });
 
 afterEach(async () => {
+    delete process.env.ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK;
     vi.useRealTimers();
     await new Promise((done) => origin.close(done));
 });
@@ -72,3 +75,32 @@ describe("tasks e sessões", () => {
         rmSync(storageRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
     });
 });
+
+describe("id de sessão", () => {
+    it("aceita um UUID já conhecido", async () => {
+        const { sessionManager, storageRoot } = await loadModules();
+        const first = sessionManager.getSession();
+        expect(sessionManager.getSession(first.id).id).toBe(first.id);
+        rmSync(storageRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    });
+
+    it.each(["..", ".", "../../etc", "a/b", "not-a-uuid", ""])(
+        "ignora o id inválido %j e cria outra sessão",
+        async (bad) => {
+            const { sessionManager, storageRoot } = await loadModules();
+            const session = sessionManager.getSession(bad);
+            expect(session.id).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f-]{36}$/);
+            expect(sessionManager.getSessionPath(session.id)).toBe(`${storageRoot}${sep}${session.id}`);
+            rmSync(storageRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+        },
+    );
+
+    it("não deixa um id '..' apagar a pasta pai quando expira", async () => {
+        const { sessionManager, storageRoot } = await loadModules();
+        sessionManager.getSession("..");
+        vi.setSystemTime(Date.now() + HOUR + 1000);
+        vi.advanceTimersByTime(60_000);
+        expect(existsSync(storageRoot)).toBe(true);
+        rmSync(storageRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    });
+});

web/src/context/SessionContext.tsx

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import React, { createContext, useContext, useEffect, useState } from "react";
+import React, { createContext, useCallback, useContext, useEffect, useState } from "react";
 
 type SessionData = {
     sessionId: string;
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ export function SessionProvider({ children }: { children: React.ReactNode }) {
     }, [sessionId]);
 
     // Poll Tasks
-    const refreshTasks = async () => {
+    const refreshTasks = useCallback(async () => {
         if (!sessionId) return;
         try {
             const res = await fetch(`${API_URL}/api/tasks`, {
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ export function SessionProvider({ children }: { children: React.ReactNode }) {
         } catch (err) {
             console.error("Failed to fetch tasks", err);
         }
-    };
+    }, [sessionId]);
 
     useEffect(() => {
         if (!sessionId) return;
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ export function SessionProvider({ children }: { children: React.ReactNode }) {
         // Poll every 2 seconds
         const interval = setInterval(refreshTasks, 2000);
         return () => clearInterval(interval);
-    }, [sessionId]);
+    }, [sessionId, refreshTasks]);
 
     const queueDownload = async (url: string) => {
         if (!sessionId) throw new Error("Session not ready, try again in a moment");