fix(skills): vendor the support files the vendored skills point at

The vendored SKILL.md files were byte-identical to upstream, but the
playbooks, templates and schemas they reference were left behind in the
original repos, so a loading skill pointed at a file that does not exist
anywhere in this repository.

Vendored 1:1 into each skill directory (so they survive
`cp -r skills/* ~/.hermes/skills/`):

- plays/ for api-security-review, code-review-security, sca-audit,
  secrets-scan, web-security-review (OWASP/secure-agent-playbook)
- templates/finding.md for the four OWASP skills that cite it
- schemas/finding.schema.json for cve-triage, patch-prioritization,
  dependency-scanning (UnitOneAI/SecuritySkills)
- docs/sarif-output.md, docs/fixer-policy.md and
  docs/normalized-json-output.md for dependency-scanning

Path fixes, the only edit to vendored text:
- the three UnitOneAI skills referenced ../../../schemas/ and ../../../docs/
  which assumed upstream's skills/<category>/<skill>/ depth; this repo is
  flat, so the links now resolve inside the skill directory
- safedeps told the agent to run <skill_dir>/../../check_deps.py while the
  script is vendored next to SKILL.md; corrected to <skill_dir>/check_deps.py
  and documented the script's exit codes (1 = finding, not a crash)
- NOTICE.md records the new files, the path edits, and the remaining known
  gaps (hermaguard's kensei-pipeline references, the ASVS dataset citations,
  and hermaguard being behind upstream)

Verified: every backticked path in every SKILL.md now resolves;
check_deps.py runs from the installed location and returns live OSV.dev
data ([email protected] -> 2 advisories); hermaguard's 46 tests still pass.
This commit is contained in:
Evandro Fonseca Junior committed 2026-09-14 07:40:21 -03:00
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@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ Typosquatting (also called dependency confusion or combosquatting) is a supply c
## Assessment Output Template
Before applying or proposing dependency changes, classify each remediation path using [Security Fixer Policy](../../../docs/fixer-policy.md). Include the policy review gate, reviewer evidence, and rollback guidance in the remediation plan.
Before applying or proposing dependency changes, classify each remediation path using [Security Fixer Policy](docs/fixer-policy.md). Include the policy review gate, reviewer evidence, and rollback guidance in the remediation plan.
When performing a dependency scan, produce findings in the following structure:
@@ -236,8 +236,8 @@ When performing a dependency scan, produce findings in the following structure:
- **Blind spots:** This skill depends on available code, configuration, logs, documentation, and user-provided context; it cannot prove controls exist or threats are absent when evidence is missing, runtime-only, or outside the review scope.
- **False-positive risks:** Treat findings as hypotheses until validated against asset criticality, compensating controls, environment intent, and recent authorized changes.
- **Required evidence:** Support each finding with concrete artifacts such as file paths and line numbers, policy snippets, scanner output, logs, screenshots, control records, or reproducible steps.
- **Normalized JSON:** When machine-readable output is requested, findings MUST be available as JSON that validates against [`schemas/finding.schema.json`](../../../schemas/finding.schema.json).
- **SARIF JSON:** When SARIF output is requested, map normalized findings to SARIF 2.1.0-compatible JSON using [`docs/sarif-output.md`](../../../docs/sarif-output.md).
- **Normalized JSON:** When machine-readable output is requested, findings MUST be available as JSON that validates against [`schemas/finding.schema.json`](schemas/finding.schema.json).
- **SARIF JSON:** When SARIF output is requested, map normalized findings to SARIF 2.1.0-compatible JSON using [`docs/sarif-output.md`](docs/sarif-output.md).
- **Escalation rules:** Escalate immediately for suspected active compromise, exposed secrets, regulated-data exposure, critical exploitable vulnerabilities, privileged-access abuse, or when evidence is insufficient to safely disposition a high-impact risk.
---